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Abstract 
dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƌŝƐŬŝŶƚŚĞ ?^ŵĂƌƚŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĂƚƉůƵƌĂůĨŽƌŵƐŽĨŬŶŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŝƚǇďĞĐŽŵĞĞĐůŝƉƐĞĚďǇ
singular governance-oriented analyses produced through computational logics originating 
from undemocratic service providers. In light of this concern, this chapter considers three 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ƐŵĂƌƚ ƵƌďĂŶŝƐŵ ?Ɛ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ŝ ? ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ƵƌďĂŶ ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ  W or 
understanding smart urbanism as a situated, socio-material practice; ii) the agency of smart 
ĐŝƚǇ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ? ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ĂŶĚ ĐŽntrol of these technologies, 
and: iii) the political rationalities, values and assumptions embedded in smart city 
ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ? design and use. Drawing on these insights, this chapter analyses smart 
knowledge politics in Barcelona, where the 2015 Council elections replaced a market-
oriented political leadership enthusiastically implementing the Smart City with a political 
leadership whose origins in social movements and citizen democracy made it deeply 
sceptical towards smart urbanism. We analyse how this opened up space for different 
approaches to using technology in the city while at the same time giving rise to materially 
very different kinds of smart knowledge configuring technologies emphasizing citizen 
participation and democratic control of knowledge production. Indeed, political rationalities 
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and smart knowledge configuring technologies intersected and co-evolved, rather than one 
informing the other unidirectionally.  
 
 
START OF THE CHAPTER 
 
 “ǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐĨůŽǁƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĚĂƚĂĐĞŶƚƌĞŝŶƚŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞŽĨthe town. So, if I own that data 
ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ? / ?ǀĞ ŐŽƚ ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ ? >ŝƚĞƌĂůůǇ ĞǀĞƌǇ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚŽǁŶ ĐŽŵĞƐ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞƌĞ  ? ? ?
^ŽůĚƚŽŵĞďǇ,ŝƚĂĐŚŝ  ? /ĂŵƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞ ? /ŐŽƚ ŝƚĂůů  ?/ƚ ?ƐŬŝŶĚŽĨĂƉĂĐŬĂŐĞĚĚĞĂů ?EŽƚũƵƐƚ
energy, or transportation, or home, or health, Žƌ ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ ? dŚĞǇ ?ƌĞ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ƌĞĂĚǇ ƚŽ ĚŽ
what looks pretty much like a city council campaign. You could actually run for office like 
ƚŚŝƐ  ? tŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ ?ǀĞ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ƐŽůĚ ŽĨĨ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŽǀĞƌ ǇŽƵƌ
ƐƚƌĞĞƚƐ ?ǁŚĞŶǇŽƵ ?ǀĞoffshored it to Silicon Valley or wherever it goes? Have you thought 
through the political implications of that? It may look smart, but how smart is that move? 
What happens if the App is on strike, or removes itself? How do you get the App back? Can 
you buy it; can you legislate it; can you code it yourself ?zŽƵ ?ƌĞŽǀĞƌĂďĂƌƌĞůƐŝƐƚĞƌ ? / ?ŵĂ
smart city but my brain is run in California. How is that supposed to work out? Look behind 
the beautiful façade! ? 
Bruce Sterling, cyberpunk, at the 10th International FabLab Convention in Barcelona1 
 
1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Bruce Sterling ?Ɛ ƋƵŽƚĞvividly captures some of the knowledge politics involved in smart 
urbanism. Or at least, the concerns critics raise against the Smart City vision: the way urban 
processes are reduced to codified, inter-operable (and tradeable) information; whose 
processing through calculation and inference produces ostensibly authoritative knowledge 
about complex cities; and whose proprietary characteristics ĐĞĚĞƐ ƉŽǁĞƌ ƚŽ  ?ƐŵĂƌƚ ĐŝƚǇ ?
service providers (Greenfield, 2012). At the same time, however, technological advances in 
sensors, data handling, internet platforms, ubiquitous computation, and ever more 
imaginative visualisation permits wider access to information about cities, and opens up the 
possibility for unprecedented citizen involvement in urban processes. 
 
Barcelona was an appropriate place for Bruce Sterling to make his remarks. He did so on a 
conference platform which later that day saw then-Mayor Xavier Trias commit Barcelona to 
becoming a smart, self-sufficient city within 40 years (see later). Under Mayor Trias, the city 
government was working hard to promote Barcelona as a world-leading smart city, and with 
considerable success (Continente et al, 2016). A wide variety of smart city installations had 
been implemented; international smart city service providers were locating their business 
                                                     
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OYNaoMkY8qY&feature=youtu.be (posted 15/07/2014; accessed 
30/09/2016) 
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operations into a test-bed district; and an ecosystem of smaller developers and start-ups 
were innovating smart Apps and other tools.2 Work was underway to integrate this 
patchwork of smart city elements into what was called an  “Operating System ? (OS) for the 
city: ƚŚĞ  “essential hardware, software and data components that quietly sit in the 
background directing urban flows, providing shared languages towards interoperability 
across multiple infrastructures ? ?DĂƌǀŝŶĂŶĚ>ƵƋƵĞ-Ayala, 2017: 1).  
 
Then, in 2015, city elections provided a moment for recent shifts in the urban political 
landscape. The new Mayor, Ada Colau, took office with a vision rooted in citizen 
mobilisations, commons and collaborative approaches to urban experimentation, and 
prototypes for direct democracy. Her new party, Barcelona en Comú [Catalan for Barcelona 
in Common] emerged from a kaleidoscope of innovative practices carried by the burst of 
activism by the 15-M movement over the period 2011-15, and which emerged in response 
to the political and economic crisis triggered by the 2008 financial crash. Barcelona en Comú 
won 11 out of 41 seats, and operates within a minority government. Under this coalition, 
the smart city was no longer a priority. Technological sovereignty has taken its place within 
a broader agenda for more democratic urban developments. In the terms of the 
Introduction to this book, Barcelona has undergone a shift in political rationality:  “particular 
ways ŽĨ ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ ?ĐĂůĐƵůĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĚ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ?ƵƌďĂŶ ?ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?  ?Ɖ ?11). Propelled 
by changing realities in the city and the emergence of new protagonists brought forwards by 
the contradictions in those realities, contending political rationalities have had 
consequences for the design and implementation of digital knowledge producing 
techniques. 
 
In this chapter, we look to Barcelona as a case study in the knowledge politics of smart 
urbanism. Barcelona helps us explore an issue central to this book, which is how  “the 
political processes through which knowledge configuring practices and strategies for 
representing the urban fabric are assembled and ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚ ?  ?/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?
p.3). What is fascinating in Barcelona, and we suspect other cities, is how digital projects can 
be disrupted, reconceived and reclaimed  W or complemented and replaced by new digital 
projects  W through urban politics that interact across elite and grassroots settings, and in 
ways that suggest more plural and hopeful possibilities.  
 
2: SMART URBANISM 
 
The smart city is not a new response to urban development, but the latest in a stream of 
initiatives over the last half century to incorporate information and communication 
technologies into processes for knowing and governing cities (Marvin and Luque-Ayala, 
                                                     
2 See the listing of multiple smart cities project at the Ajuntament website smartcity.bcn.cat (accessed 18th 
October 2016) 
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2017). Often, the promise of such radical technological changes is to rationalise urban 
ƐŽĐŝŽƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ƌŝƐŬƐ ĞŶƚƌĞŶĐŚŝŶŐ Ă  ?post-
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ? ?ƚĞĐŚŶŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?^ǁǇŶŐĞĚŽƵǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ritical urban scholars see 
in smart city visions and experiments the interests of a rather narrow neo-liberal agenda 
focused upon technological fixes controlled by coalitions of corporate actors and city elites 
(Greenfield, 2013; Kitchen, 2014). As such, cities cede authoritative urban knowledge 
production, which should be subject to democratic scrutiny, to commercially interested 
technology providers. In this line of argument, ownership and control of knowledge 
producing and urban governance technologies are key political issues (Feenberg, 1999). Yet, 
advocates argue that ceding authoritative urban knowledge production to private parties is 
a reasonable political arrangement if those commercially interested smart city service 
providers produce knowledge that improves urban performance for their public authority 
clients, and if citizens benefit from improved services and more efficient use of their tax 
contributions. In this controversy between advocates and critics of the smart city, 
knowledge politics emerges with regard to the ownership and control of the knowledge 
production apparatus, its credibility and its performance. 
 
Advocates and critics alike tend to see smart city technologies as largely impacting upon 
cities, like an external force of change, for good or ill. Sometimes there is recognition that 
smart technologies are shaped by global social and technological processes, such as neo-
liberal ideology, public research into computation and Big Data, the rise of Silicon Valley, or 
normalising digital cultures. These social forces are usually deemed so pervasive or powerful 
that, from the perspective of an individual city, they appear as all-determining (Jordan, 
2008). However, there remains relatively little consideration for the way in which digital 
technology developments may take shape in specific socio-material urban settings. Urban 
actors and historical social and material heritage exercising agency  W which we will refer to 
as urban agencies  W over digitally-enabled ways of conceiving, knowing about and 
intervening in urban development tend to be overlooked or downplayed.  
 
Indeed, grassroots initiatives have been developing alongside off-the-shelf packages for 
smart city services, for instance in the area of sensors and environmental information; a 
development which potentially opens uses of ICT for citizen-led urban governance (Tironi 
and Sanchez Criado, 2015; Gabrys, 2014). Arguably, more democratic control of smart city 
technologies, including the utilization of free and open software protocols, permits 
pluralistic values and assumptions to continually enter governance debates and 
deliberations (Kurban et al, 2017). Furthermore, whilst powerful market and ideological 
dynamics shape ICT developments into forms that centralise urban knowledge convenient 
to corporate and urban elites, the implementation of off-the-shelf packages requires 
adaptation to a particular city ?s characteristics (Kahn and Kellner, 2007). Global social forces 
are therefore always confronted with local dynamics, which therefore need to be taken into 
account to understand smart urbanism. Municipalities are also developing expertise in-
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house, and working with grassroots groups, local businesses and larger providers to develop 
bespoke services (Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2015; Hajer and Dassen, 2014). Recognizing 
urban agencies in smart city developments highlights that a much more hybrid, less 
monolithic smart urbanism is emerging, each nevertheless involving an inescapable 
knowledge politics. 
 
Overlooking urban agencies in favour of focussing on global social and technological 
processes shaping smart technologies also obfuscates the agency of smart technologies ?
materialities themselves  W rather than their ownership and control  W in the production of 
knowledge for urban governance. Ɛ ƚŚŝƐ ďŽŽŬ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŽƌǇ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ? ƚŚĞ
production of knowledge is rooted not only in discourse but also in material epistemic 
technologies: material artifacts enacting and articulating certain ways of knowing the city. 
dŚĞƌĞĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƐŵĂƌƚĐŝƚǇ ?Ɛpromises relies upon the production, analysis and integration 
of big and varied data-sets, produced by a plethora of sensors (including static devices 
embedded in city infrastructures and mobile devices carried by citizens), and run by 
computers and servers whose calculations produce representations (ideally in real-time) 
about different aspects of city performance. Knowledge is produced through networked 
platforms: city-dash boards, Apps, control centres, and other devices that enable people to 
know what is going on in the city and who can intervene to adapt behaviour accordingly. 
These devices may afford different kinds of human participation: the devices enact people 
and other things in certain ways (Tironi, 2015). Some smart-enabled interventions are highly 
automated, such as the optimisation of traffic systems, or the triggering of actuators linked 
to, say, irrigation of parks. In other cases, human users are required to respond to signals, 
nudges or incentives issued by the smart city system, effectively acting automatically if 
human response involves little reflection. And then there are smart services that invite more 
active deliberation and decision by  ?smart citizens ?, particularly when platforms are open to 
adaptation, but nevertheless within an invited arena with designed parameters for 
participation (Vanolo, 2016; Kurban et al., 2017).  
 
Knowledge emerging from smart technologies is not only political because this knowledge 
may play an active role in urban governance decision-making, but also because the process 
of knowledge creation inevitably involves making choices, an insight emerging from science 
and technology studies (STS; see Introduction chapter). Whilst there are distinct schools of 
ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? Ăƚ ŝƚƐ ŚĞĂƌƚ ^d^ ĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐ ŚŽǁ ĂŶǇ  ?ƚĞĐŚŶŽ-ƐĐŝĞŶƚŝĨŝĐ ? ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞƚƚĞƌ
understand and govern complex worlds, necessarily carries normative assumptions and 
values in its design and implementation (Jasanoff, 2004). The knowledge produced by a 
smart city project is constructed through the interaction of design choices, user practices, 
the platforms themselves and the agency of the material characteristics of the issue about 
which knowledge is being produced (Latour, 2005). In other words, knowledge production in 
smart platforms is a political process, involving multi-scalar negotiation, agreement and 
dispute about the implementation of smart city technologies. This effectively determines 
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what information is gathered, how knowledge is produced (as well as inevitable gaps and 
uncertainties) and interpreted, and then how these insights are represented as reliable 
knowledge for acting in the city (Matthewman, 2011).  
 
From this short review, the following three aspects of ƐŵĂƌƚƵƌďĂŶŝƐŵ ?Ɛknowledge politics 
can be distilled: i) the critical role of urban agencies  W or understanding smart urbanism as a 
situated, socio-material practice; ii) the agency of smart city technologies ? ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƚǇ as 
well as the ownership and control of these technologies, and: iii) the political rationalities, 
values and assumptions embodied in their design and use. We will use these insights as a 
lens on Barcelona as a smart city in order to better understand the interrelation between 
smart knowledge configuring practices and shifting political rationalities.  
 
3: BARCELONA: MOVING BEYOND THE SMART CITY? 
 
Barcelona is often presented internationally as a pioneer in modern urbanism. The Cerdà 
plan extended (and liberated) the city beyond its walls in the 1860s in a way that became 
symbolic for modernisation (Aibar and Bijker, 1987). Soon after the walls fell, the city 
fortress was demolished in order to create space for a Universal Exposition in 1888 (and 
what became the Ciutadella Park). The Exposition showcased urban redevelopments and a 
modern city to over 2 million visitors. ƐĞĐŽŶĚtŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ&Ăŝƌwas held on Montjuïc in 1929. 
Developments for this exposition, conceived as a further motor for city development, 
similarly produced important monuments to modernisation. This  ?model ? evolved fitfully 
over the years - an international projection of the city based in modernising district 
developments  W and found spectacular expression with the Olympic Games in 1992, and a 
less successful attempt with the Universal Forum of Cultures in 2004 (Degen and García, 
2012). 
 
Implementation of the  ?Barcelona model ? (Ribera-Fumaz, 2017) always involved political 
controversy and social and economic struggle (Aibar and Bijker, 1987; McDonogh, 2011): 
between social classes, over space, in the priorities and directions for development, 
concerning rights to the city, contradictions between attracting inward investment and 
attending to neighbourhood needs, and, pertinent here, the selective use of technology and 
knowledge about the city. Confronting the models of ĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂ ?ƐƵƌďĂŶĞůŝƚĞ is a grassroots 
history of working class struggle, neighbourhood and nationalist politics, and social 
movements, all of which have understood their city quite differently. These contentious 
histories provide an important context for appreciating the arrival of the Smart City in 
Barcelona, and an aspiration for technological sovereignty. 
 
3.1 The smart city vision 
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The positioning of Barcelona amongst the vanguard of Smart Cities was attempted most 
explicitly and vigorously under the leadership of Mayor Trias (2011-15) (Continente et al, 
2016). dƌŝĂƐ ?Ɛ deputy mayor for Urban Habitat, Antoni Vives, and the department ?s general 
director Vicente Gaullart set about articulating and implementing the vision. Prior to 
entering public office, Vives and Gaullart had been co-founders in 2001 of the Institute of 
Advanced Architecture of Catalonia (IAAC), dedicated to propel research and education 
about bringing new technologies into urban spaces. Whilst drawing upon visionary ideas 
cultivated at IAAC, these smart city leaders capitalized on projects and skills already present 
in Barcelona. In doing so, they articulated and repackaged initiatives already underway in 
the city, attempting to re-orientate the city to their vision.  
 
In terms of operations and strategies already present in the area, the city had in 1990 
created the Municipal Institute for Information Technology (IMI  W Institut Municipal 
Ě ?/ŶĨŽƌŵăƚŝĐĂ ? ĂƐ ĂŶ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂů ďŽĚǇ ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ /d ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞs. Fibre-optic cable 
began weaving through the city from 1994, and the introduction of networked computing 
services promoted thereafter. In 2000, the previous city council had announced an 
ambitious plan to develop a Knowledge District in the Poblenou area. Informed by a second 
phase of regeneration planning after the Olympics, this relatively run-down and poorly-
served district was earmarked for residential, educational and commercial developments. 
The objective was to turn it into an attractive site for international investment in a 
knowledge economy that would attract a high-skill workforce to the city, including the ICT 
sector (Leon, 2008). The district was called 22@ and a municipal company, also called 22@, 
was created to market and manage the real estate and infrastructure projects involved. 
International property developers and investment firms began investing in the buildings 
rising above the old factories, mechanics and artists workshops, and housing.3 The Torre 
Llacuna towerbuilding iconic for 22@ was completed in 2003. The nearby Media-ICT 
building won the World Building of the Year award in 2011 (March and Ribera-Fumaz, 2014: 
5; Continente et al, 2014). Local universities opened campuses in the district. Barcelona 
Activa, the economic development agency of the city council, turned its attention to high-
tech start-ups and entrepreneurs, and opened offices and provided incubation space in the 
Media-ICT building.  
 
Under mayor Trias, Barcelona committed to Open Data policy in 2011, and began providing 
citizens and businesses with access to some of the information gathered by the council 
about the city. The city was selected as the Mobile World Capital by GSMA in 2011, and 
hence hosted future Mobile World congress events as well as the Smart City Expo since the 
same year. These events brought business executives and urban policy-makers to the city. 
Moves were made to attract international smart city technology firms to locate their 
                                                     
3 Whose neglect had provided space for artists and creative collectives now being displaced by the room being 
made for knowledge industry (Martí-Costa and Pradel I Miquel, 2012). A local campaign to resist and moderate 
22@ to local needs had limited success. 
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development operations in 22@. Strategic agreements were announced, for example, with 
Cisco, IBM, Schneider-Telvent, Telefónica, GDF Suez and others. Indeed, as the smart city 
vision developed, so 22@ became marketed as a campus for smart city developments 
(March and Ribera-Fumaz, 2014; Charnock et al, 2014). 
 
Smart systems were in place, or being established, to monitor and control traffic, energy, 
water use in parks, waste collection services, social services, care for the elderly, public 
transportation, and so forth (Bakici et al, 2013; Kuyper, 2016). IMI and others were 
developing software systems for managing the accumulation of thousands of diverse of 
sensors (e.g. the Sentilo open-software platform). Leaders invited, and incentivized, 
technology developers to embed themselves in the city and conduct smart urban 
experiments. Local entrepreneurs and start-ups were encouraged to make use of the data 
and platforms that were emerging, and to participate in smart city projects (Capdevila and 
Zarlenga, 2015). The city announced ambitions to create a city Operating System that would 
interconnect information from across the multiplying sensor networks and data gathering 
platforms in different city administration departments, and hence boost the ability of city 
authorities to observe and manage their intelligent city in real time.  
 
Intriguingly, Vives announced, and began implementing, a plan to open ten public digital 
fabrication workshops in each of the ten districts of Barcelona as part of the smart city 
vision. /ŶƐƉŝƌĞĚďǇĂ ?FabLĂď ?ŵŽĚĞůŽƌŝŐŝŶĂƚŝŶŐĂƚD/d (and which IAAC had pioneered on its 
premises since 2006), these  ?Ateneus de Fabricació Digital ? were equipped with a suite of 
digital design and fabrication technologies that would allow citizens to train and experiment 
in the prototyping of physical objects, and to share designs, knowledge and collaborate 
digitally with similar workshops globally (Smith, 2015). A network of neighbourhood 
Ateneus was envisaged as part of the public infrastructure for the 21st century smart city. 
These production facilities were envisaged as enabling Barcelona to become more 
materially self-sufficient whilst competing in a more sustainable world: sustainable design 
knowledge will be traded globally, but physical goods were made (and remanufactured) in 
local circular economies (Diez, 2012). At the 10th FabLab convention held in Barcelona in 
2014, Mayor Trias committed his city to making over half the goods its consumed locally 
within 40 years (the smart, self-sufficient city; see Guallart, 2014).  
 
The ambition with the extensive portfolio of smart initiatives was to simultaneously attract 
and finance industrial development, such that Barcelona would become a global hub for the 
development of (exportable) smart city services, whilst modernizing the city itself for a 
smart citizenship  W a citizenship comfortable using technology applications, responding to 
the data that they willingly contribute towards smart city services, but not necessarily 
demanding other rights and responsibilities. By July 2015, Fortune magazine was writing 
ŚŽǁ ĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂ ǁĂƐ  ?ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ǁŝƌĞĚ ĐŝƚǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ?  ?tĂůƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ?. The city regularly 
featured at the top of global rankings for smart cities and innovative cities. 
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And yet, throughout these developments, citizens of Barcelona were positioned as relatively 
passive beneficiaries of smart city developments: as users of the services provided, 
beneficiaries of the visionary developments, workers in the new sectors; but, apart from the 
tech entrepreneurs, citizens actively involved in initiating and shaping ŐƌĂƐƐƌŽŽƚƐ  ?smart ? 
developments were overlooked. Meanwhile, myriad contracts were struck with businesses 
to develop the technologies and services, and demonstration funds from the European 
Commission and elsewhere were used to help embed smart-devices in urban development. 
Ɛ &ŽƌƚƵŶĞ ŵĂŐĂǌŝŶĞ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?  “Discreet and largely unannounced, the changes in 
Barcelona have slipped by even observant residents  ? zet the stealthy transformation is 
profound and potentially so sweeping that no one is sure where it will lead ? ?tĂůƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? In 
fact, announcements were made, and marketed very professionally, but appeared to be 
addressed as much, if not more, ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƐ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ƚŽĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂ ?Ɛglobal 
position, than to local users of the new services. 
 
3.2 Grassroots digital urbanism 
 
Whilst the smart city was being embedded in bus-stops, lamp posts, refuse bins, mobility 
systems, and machine-readable databases, and whose sensors and actuators were being 
interconnected through a developing Operating System, another smart Barcelona was 
becoming increasingly vocal and active. The economic crisis signalled by the financial 
collapse of 2008, and whose political consequences ŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵĞĚdƌŝĂƐ ?s predecessor, was 
now troubling his administration in turn. 
 
Construction, housebuilding, and urban developments had fuelled much of the economic 
growth in Spain from the 1990s, until the bubble burst in 2008 (García, 2010). The exposure 
of Spain to the global financial crisis was exacerbated by an associated implosion of its 
property market. Many families were left unable to meet mortgage repayments and, by 
2012, one household was being evicted every 15 minutes; even though there was little 
social support for the homeless, and with 3.4 million homes vacant (Romanos, 2013). The 
Platform of Mortgage Victims (PAH, La Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca, formed in 
2009) articulated moral outrage at this situation and mobilised it into effective practical 
action. In doing so, it became a citizen mobilisation significant beyond housing, in Barcelona 
and hundreds of other cities, and that joined a confluence of actions in energy, mobility, 
culture, urbanism, and communications arising from 15-M in 2011. In the streets, and 
through varied actions, a broader vision for democracy and urban governance began to be 
articulated that was quite different to dƌŝĂƐ ?smart urbanism, and political programmes to 
put the broader vision into effect were developed (Gutiérrez, 2017; Gonick, 2016).  
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PAH built a power base that enabled it to renegotiate housing contracts and debt 
repayments on behalf of individual members. PAH did this by reframing evictions as a 
systemic and institutional issue rather than an individual failing, and coordinated more 
conventional campaigning activities for housing reforms alongside its practical help and 
solidarity for individual households (De Weerdt and Garcia, 2016). Digital tools helped in the 
organisation and communication of this activity at scale: making decisions, operating 
transparently, sharing information, eviction alerts, and experience about legal and banking 
matters, and networking between neighbourhood associations, especially when the 
campaign moved rapidly and began to operate nationally. 
 
Grassroots groups were developing initiatives in what was becoming known widely as the 
solidarity economy: loosely affiliated systems of cooperative production and consumption 
initiatives in areas as diverse as food, mobility, energy, culture, housing, and politics. A 
variety of digital tools and platforms were being developed by activist coders and grassroots 
groups for assisting and coordinating solidarity and cooperative economic activity. Digital 
social innovations helped advance offline activities in citizen urbanism. Included in 
movement thinking was a rejection of neo-liberal models of globally competitive, 
marketised cities and, in the context of urbanism, new ways of thinking and doing urban 
practices dedicated to prototyping open neighbourhood developments, and through this 
the production of common goods and services (Estalella et al, 2013). 
 
Experimental platforms were being built, typically involving an ethic of openness and 
collaboration inspired by free software and free culture movements, for connecting local 
producers to consumers, promoting ethical and solidarity exchanges, and anticipating 
different kinds of digitally-enabled currency, peer-production and collaborative 
consumption. Digital citizen deliberation techniques were emerging from the multitude of 
groups, networks, platforms and associations throughout Spain (2011-13) (Gutiérrez, 2017; 
Monterde et al, 2015). Activists in Barcelona worked in collaboration with activists in 
Madrid, A Coruña, Sevilla, and other cities in Spain. At the same time as developing tools, 
there were debates and discussions about the conceptual frameworks for organising this 
activity, and for doing so strategically. Threading together the kaleidoscope of initiatives 
were commitments to direct democracy, transparency and citizen-centred forms of 
governance, and borne of indignation towards an incumbent system deemed (in the context 
of revelations of political and business corruption emerging after the economic crisis) to be 
inept, corrupt, closed, and self-serving (Gutiérrez, 2017). 
 
The new visions for direct democratic urban practice were inspired by affinities between 
concepts coming from autonomist and feminist movements, free culture movements, and, 
significantly, the free software movement. A hacker ethic towards decentralised forms of 
online coordination, collaboration and peer production, and commitment to transparent 
and democratic rights in technology, informed the conceptual thinking. If the smart city 
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vision subsumed (and shaped) digital affordances within a logic of markets, service provision 
and neo-liberal ideas about urban efficiency, then here, activists were shaping digital 
affordances and applying them within a quite different framework. A generation 
accustomed to accessible digital technology speeding up their ability to communicate and 
organise, took this practice in a seemingly more directly democratic direction. Social media 
ƚŽŽůƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĂĚĂƉƚĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ  ?ƚĞĐŚŶŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ŵĞĚŝĂ ? ĨŽƌ ? ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŶŐ ideas; discussing them, 
opposing them and modifying them; voting and taking decisions; and communicating this 
through content creation using new media (Kurban et al, 2017). These tools proved 
promising and helpful, and took the concept of digital cities in quite different directions 
compared to the closed development of dashboards and platforms by technology 
corporations, and in which data is centralised, released conditionally, and wraps a veneer of 
transparency and controlled participation around existing urban institutions. Moving 
beyond these elite forms of e-government, technopolitical activists were working at 
canvassing citizen knowledge to build more direct decision-making, and citizen-led urban 
governance, and connecting citizens as protagonists in new relations with representative 
democratic institutions (Kurban et al, 2017). These digital platforms relied upon voluntary 
contributions of knowledge and skill, and crowdsourced funds. The code for tools developed 
originally to organise 15-M occupations, and for coordinating and debating developments in 
initiatives and movements thereafter, was shared through GitHub, such as the Consul free 
software. Early platforms like Propongo, and tools used by Partido X and Podemos, went on 
to underpin city platforms like Decide.es, and that are now being used by a variety of city 
administrations. 
 
All this was happening at the same time as the international promotion of Barcelona as a 
smart city. Activists saw two different cities: the elite Barcelona using smart city as a brand 
in its neo-liberal competition for capital  W a city rendered into an efficient and convivial 
location for mass tourism and the global knowledge economy; and the Barcelona of 
neighbourhood activism, struggling to build from below what they considered to be a more 
democratic urbanism capable of addressing issues and problems considered inherent to the 
neo-liberal model. Tellingly, when the city council moved to open one of its first Ateneus de 
Fabricació Digital in the disadvantaged neighbourhood of Ciutat Meridiana in 2013, for 
example, the building they chose was already being used by a community food bank. 
Neighbours occupied the building in protest: they needed food and local solidarity, not 3D 
printers and design platforms. A resolution was found in re-housing the food bank and 
committing the Ateneu to training young people into work. The event illustrated a clash 
between the citizens envisaged by the Council in the future smart city with the pressing 
realities confronting citizens today (Smith, 2015). 
 
The example of decision-making platforms illustrates how various technopolitical actors 
were helping connect traditional forms of urban activism to new scales and forms of 
agenda-setting, decision-making and mobilisation amongst citizens, and in so doing create 
 12 
new ways of knowing and acting in the city. Mistakes, lessons, and knowledge production 
could proceed rapidly: about local activities, discussed, shared, reframed, aggregated with 
knowledge about similar initiatives elsewhere, and mobilised and organised for a more 
participatory, commons-based and democratic kind of urbanism. Platforms provided new 
ways of engaging and connecting with more traditional forms of neighbour mobilisation. 
Activist were practising an incipient urban governance operating beneath and around 
existing institutions. Ultimately, however, some activists argued that if democratic 
technopolitics  W the subversive use of technologies combined with legal and political tools  W 
was to realise its potential in less precarious and more influential ways, an engagement with 
city institutions was necessary (Kurban et al., 2017). New parties like Podemos and 
Barcelona en Comú were formed from amongst activist networks as a strategy to enter and 
transform urban institutions (Eizaguirre and Pradel-Miquel, 2017).  
 
3.3 Technological sovereignty 
 
Democratic technopolitics was instrumental to the development of the new political parties 
that emerged from the 15-M social movements, including Podemos and Barcelona en 
Comú. Platforms were used to select candidates, publish financial information, set agendas, 
debate issues, communicate across meetings, decentralise campaigns to local groups, 
communicate with allied groups, networks and movements, and keep leaderships 
accountable to the horizontal networks that constituted their power base. Working in this 
way in 2015 city elections (Eizaguirre and Pradel-Miquel, 2017), Barcelona en Comú won 
enough votes to form a minority city government in partnership with other parties. Ada 
Colau, who had been a spokesperson for PAH, became Mayor. 
 
 Smart urbanism was not a priority compared to issues of housing, corruption, mass tourism, 
rights to the city, and aspirations for more commons-based economic activity and the 
remunicipalisation of core city services. Nevertheless, digital tools for public deliberation 
were emblematic of aspirations to create a new way for city politics. Moreover, the 
underlying vision for approaching these and other issues, seeking commons-based 
developments through citizen participation, were informed by ideas in free culture and 
commons-based urbanism similar to those inspiring democratic technopolitics. The smart 
city of the previous administration came to be reconsidered through a technopolitical lens, 
and digital urbanism in the city reoriented to a policy of technological sovereignty. Another 
strand to the technological sovereignty vision was mounting concern about the 
concentration of data in the hands of a handful of poorly regulated technology platform 
providers. Wikileaks revelations of state interest in this data similarly heightened concern 
about data and control over technology. Questions of data sovereignty and the capacity of 
citizen rights in basic information utilities were a topic moving beyond digital activism and 
into the public eye. 
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It took time to develop a digital strategy aligned to the democratic urban commons towards 
which the new city government aspired. Studies were commissioned and people appointed, 
including Francesca Bria as Chief Technology and Digital Innovation Officer, and who had a 
background in European digital projects aligned to technopolitical aspirations. Some of 
these projects, such as the D-CENT citizen deliberation platform, involved technopolitics 
activists based in Barcelona. The new Digital City Plan for 2017-2020 was published in 
October 2016. The leitmotif for the new plan was to move beyond the smart city and 
transition to technological sovereignty. Transparent digital technologies accountable to 
citizens were sought in the strategy, and that would contribute to urbanism that is 
commons-based, circular and creative (Barcelona City Council, 2016). Council policy is to 
develop a data commons, and to use this transparently through open source digital 
practices. It involves a redirection and redevelopment of the Operating System projects 
inherited from the previous administration. 
 
Emblematic projects have been established to implement the plan. Decidim.Barcelona has 
taken the technopolitics platforms for activist agenda-setting and decision-making, and 
developed these into a platform for citizen participation in urban policy and development.4 
In keeping with the activist ethos, not only is the platform open source, but so too is the 
process for reflecting upon its ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ Ă  ?ŵĞƚĂ-laď ?ŽĨ
open debate. This includes discussion about connecting online deliberation with face-to-
face discussion and activity: bringing social weight to online information through the 
involvement of urban groups and the organisation of neighbourhood meetings. Decidim 
benefitted from earlier work in the D-CENT European Commission project for developing 
direct democracy platforms and which involved Francesca Bria, then at Nesta, and other 
European partners. A further European project, called DECODE, involves the city council 
digital team working with European partners in the development of blockchain techniques 
aimed at giving citizens greater control over their digital identity, with tools to help them set 
the way their data is shared for public good purposes (cf corporate models of data 
extraction). Meanwhile, Decidim has been used to open up council processes to citizen 
participation, in the form of canvassing ideas and suggestions, coordinating comment and 
discussion, and voting on decisions, and which have input to planning documents, local 
initiatives, budgeting, and other areas. It is currently being used in a process to rethink the 
development of the 22@ district and open it to citizen proposals. The aspiration is for new 
ways for people to participate in knowing and shaping the city: not as data points, but as co-
designers.  
 
                                                     
4 The code and services offered by Barcelona.Decidim, and the Decide platforms from which it forked, are 
being taken up by other cities around the world and competing against commercial citizen participation 
services.. 
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Inserting these new design requirements into contracting arrangements with digital service 
providers has been part of the technological sovereignty policy. The reform of public 
purchasing policy to require open software and see data ethics encoded into techniques 
that give each citizen rights over their data is a key measure, although it is as of yet unclear 
what kinds of changes these requirements will induce. It is not always possible to 
renegotiate arrangements to the proprietary contracts struck by the previous 
administration, and so not all digital governance is retrospectively sovereign to council and 
citizens. Increasing diversity amongst vendors and providers, and not being reliant upon a 
limited number of packages, is another way the city authorities are trying to assert 
sovereignty. The promotion and opening up to digital social innovation providers, for 
example, and taking policy cues from free culture approaches, involves city authorities 
inserting values and assumptions that differ from those of the previous regime into digital 
infrastructures and services. Digital methods are being applied to the issues central to 
ĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂ ĞŶ ŽŵƷ ?Ɛpolitical vision, such as Big Data techniques for advancing socially 
inclusive housing and addressing illicit holiday lets, for example; or ensuring participation in 
the design of neighbourhood projects; or the commitment to transparency in public 
administration and politics.  
 
Such diversity and more hybrid arrangements work to shift political relations in digitally 
enabled knowledge about the city. But the technology sovereignty vision is nevertheless 
tempered by the necessity of remaining competitive in a global digital economy. The 
strategy is careful to go beyond the smart city, while not rejecting smart urbanism. The plan 
speaks to diversify the digital economy. Agreements and provisions are made to continue 
promoting Barcelona as an attractive investment location for technology firms. Barcelona 
Activa remains an important hub for entrepreneurship, but now includes a team dedicated 
to supporting the solidarity economy, and which helps groups pioneering digital social 
innovation in the city. The promotion of the city to capital continues with Smart City Expo 
and Mobile World Congress. There are policies for promoting skills and facilities for Industry 
4.0, at the same time as support for a Makerdistrict and continued promotion of the 
Ateneus de Fabricació Digital. This raises interesting questions about the flexibility in which 
some knowledge producing activities can easily move into the technological sovereignty 
rationale with little apparent change in practices. Programmes and initiatives to enable 
active citizen involvement in digital commons can equally equip them to work in the digital 
economy. 
 
In all these changes in the political rationalities in relation to smart urbanism projects, it is 
important to remember that political leadership in the technology sovereignty strategy 
comes from a new political party borne of social movements, yet whose minority position in 
the council leaves it dependent upon agreements with other parties witŚĚŝĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?ƐĞĞƚŚĞ/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚĞĚĐŝƚǇĐŽƵŶĐŝůŝŶŚĞƌŝƚƐĐŝƚǇ
institutions and administrative bureaucracy and materialities (the Operating System, for 
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example, and contracts already in place) shaped by historic layers of complex economic, 
social and political compromises not of their own making, and with which the digital 
strategy has to negotiate.  
 
Not all urbanism is viewed through a digital lens, whether sovereign or smart. We write this 
chapter during the crisis in relations between Catalunya and the Spanish state, in which 
older forms of politics are dividing opinion and playing for advantage, and while Barcelona 
en Comù is a minority government that recently became even smaller after a recent fallout 
with one of its coalition partners. Highly charged contentions over sovereignty, democracy, 
and governance are at stake, and in which ĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂ ?Ɛ future rests. 
 
4: COMPETING RATIONALITIES OF SMART CITY FUTURES 
The picture that emerges from our theoretical review and the example of Barcelona 
suggests more nuance is needed compared to the smart city solutionism of advocates and 
the troubling hegemony seen by critics. Smart city technologies do not land in cities as 
packages for installation or domination, but are actively shaped by specific urban situations 
that have histories and geographies; in which smart city initiatives negotiate complex 
institutional layers, and where digital initiatives are shaped and altered as much as digital 
imperatives shape those contexts.  
 
In Barcelona, we see two major, contesting political rationalities for digital urban 
development, ĞĂĐŚ ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ŐůŽďĂů ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂ ?Ɛsocio-material 
history and the specific life histories of key urban actors. Under mayor Trias, a smart city 
marketplace emerging from the corporate world was being promoted as an attempt to 
revitalise the competitiveness of the urban economy combined with programmes in which 
citizens were invited to train and experiment in the use of digital technologies. This 
ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇĚƌĂǁƐŽŶĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĂƐĂƐŚŽǁĐĂƐĞŵŽĚĞůĨŽƌŵŽĚĞƌŶƵƌďĂŶŝƐŵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ
ƚĂŶŐŝďůĞ ŝŶ ĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ-day socio-material urban fabric for example through its 
ongoing role as host of events such as the Smart City Expo, the material presence of the 
Cerdà plan ŝŶĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂ ?ƐƐƚƌĞĞƚůĂǇŽƵƚ ?and the legacy of earlier international urban events. 
It is also inspired by the personal experience of Antoni Vives and Vicente Gaullart, who had 
been co-founders in 2001 of the IAAC, which was dedicated to advancing research and 
education on the use of new technologies in urban spaces. On the margins, and later under 
mayor Colau, this position was challenged by another political rationality which rejected 
neo-liberal models of globally competitive, marketized cities. Within the context of 
ĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂ ?Ɛ ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ĂŶĚ ĚƌĂǁŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂů ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?this 
alternative was committed to direct democracy, transparency and citizen-centred forms of 
governance (Gutiérrez, 2017; Eizaguirre and Pradel, 2017). For its engagement with digital 
technologies, this movement drew on a hacker ethic, working with decentralised forms of 
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online coordination and open source technologies, committed to transparent and 
democratic rights in technology.  
 
As part of these different political rationalities, different kinds of smart knowledge 
configuring technologies were created. An important point to take from this is that 
knowledge politics figures around a multiplicity of urban transformations, not a single 
transition process. Under Trias, systems monitoring and controlling traffic, energy, water 
use in parks, waste collection services and more were put in place, and which were to be 
combined in a City Operating System under uncertain and complex arrangements of 
ownership and control between city authorities and companies supplying these 
technologies (Bakici et al., 2013; Kuyper, 2016). Such systems create knowledge based on 
the relatively passive participation of people and objects, whose behaviour is observed and 
measured using sensors and algorithms. These technologies were not introduced 
throughout the entire city, but in specific sectors, issues and/or districts amenable to 
prevailing investment and development opportunities. And, on the margins, there were 
resourceful spaces for activists and social entrepreneurs to develop alternative digital 
practices (including European Union programmes5), and which have also been infiltrating 
smart urbanism (Tironi and Sanchéz Criado, 2015; cf Marvin and Luque-Ayala, 2017). These 
examples illustrate that urban agencies always need to be taken into account when trying to 
understand smart urbanism, also when the influence of neo-liberal ideology and 
international corporations is strong.  
 
Urban agencies are even more tangible in the case of smart knowledge configuring 
technologies that emerged among grassroots movements and later when Barcelona en 
Comù took minority control of the council. This episode shows that political rationalities and 
smart knowledge configuring technologies intersected and co-evolved, rather than one 
informing the other unidirectionally. Furthermore, the technologies that were created 
among grassroots movements at the time of the housing crisis are materially very different 
from the sensing and monitoring systems put in place under mayor Trias, and through their 
material difference facilitate different kinds of politics. Initially, grassroots movements 
appropriated open digital technologies for coordination and communication, based on 
principles of openness, accessibility, collaboration, decentralisation and sharing. These 
technologies helped to organize effective direct-action and to develop alternative political 
visions. Digital tools were also being developed to assist and coordinate solidarity and 
cooperative economic activity, for example connecting local producers to consumers. 
Changes in control of the city council in Barcelona then opened up space for grassroots 
approaches to move beyond prototyping, beginning to institutionalize. dŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐŶĞǁdigital 
strategy seeks technologies accountable to citizens, technologies which contribute to 
urbanism that is commons-based, circular and creative (Barcelona City Council, 2016). 
                                                     
5 See, for example, projects funded by the Collective Awareness Platforms for Sustainability and Social 
Innovation funded by the EU H2020 and FP7 programmes. https://capssi.eu/  
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Decidim.Barcelona was developed, facilitating communication with established institutions 
on policy issues through a combination of online deliberation with face-to-face discussion 
(Kurban et al., 2016). Commitments to values of openness, transparency and participation 
materialize through the design of the platform: it is open-source, and there is space for 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵ ?ƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĨƵƚƵƌĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?The creation of knowledge 
through Decidim.Barcelona and other platforms relies on the voluntary contributions of 
participants, who gain rather than lose agency through their participation. The politics of 
knowledge here spills beyond a powerful agent introducing synoptic technologies that 
consolidate and extend the framings of dominant interests in urban development: digital 
technologies are opened up by dynamic and contradictory initiatives in the city, between 
different urban actors and developments, and smart technology becomes a strategy for 
redefining and redistributing power relations in urban development. Indeed, the Barcelona 
case shows that a plurality of political rationalities sought different expectations, values and 
assumptions in the design of digital services, which had to be negotiated in the creation and 
use of technologies in the city.   
 
5: CONCLUDING REMARKS: AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
It is important to be reflexive towards the analysis presented here. Our approach to 
understanding the knowledge politics of smart urbanism looked at how contending ideas 
and experiences in urbanism, linked to shifting political control in the city, shaped and were 
shaped by the development of digital apparatuses for knowing and acting in the city. Our 
own knowledge producing apparatus (our analytical framework and method) was 
productive for this purpose, but also overlooks important aspects of knowledge politics in 
smart urbanism. Our framing at the level of the city as a whole meant that the development 
consequences of fixing specific urban sub-systems through digital means was outside our 
focus. To what degree, for example, do investments in specific smart systems entrain a 
degree of path-dependent developments that are difficult to dismantle or re-orientate, 
should that be desired or required? Recoding and retooling is no straightforward matter 
once sociotechnical configurations stabilise and institutionalise. Indeed, technologies have a 
tendency to hardwire social relations (Latour, 1991), and to act as a source of inertia or even 
path-dependency over social relations seeking reforms (Kemp et al., 1998).  
 
Furthermore, it is clear that further in-depth analysis of the enactment of smart 
technologies, such as sensor networks, or city databases or digital fabrication facilities, are 
required to assess the material consequences of core functional logics in digital approaches, 
to understand whether and how the computational logic of these smart technologies is 
susceptible to changes in urban rationale, and which knowledges are bracketed out or 
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included in re-aligned digital codifications.6 For example, knowledge about sustainability 
appears in reduced form in the smart city and technology sovereignty strategies in 
Barcelona. Notions of a self-sufficient city in the previous administration included an 
ecological modernist notion of how digital technologies will manage better urban 
metabolisms and close the loops of production and consumption through digital fabrication. 
Commitments to a circular economy in the technology sovereignty strategy similarly see 
sustainability in terms of managing material flows and metabolisms. The material and social 
footprint of digital technologies themselves are glossed over. Any risks that digital 
infrastructures lock societies into accelerated cycles of upgrades and obsolescence, and 
whose material implications are troubling, are currently skirted around by digital policy. 
Knowledge that critiques ecological modernisation (York and Rosa, 2003), and that 
problematizes innovation as a solution to sustainable development, is not integral to the 
digital apparatus of knowledge production. Framings of urban sustainability that see socio-
ecological relations as more than informational, and that propose less instrumental, more 
experiential and embodied ways of knowing and sensing, do not (yet) connect to digital 
framings and knowledge producing apparatus. There may be affinities as well as tensions: 
for example, can we conceive of digital technological sufficiency?7 
 
Indeed, with respect to inherent characteristics of approaching the urban through digital 
methods, one may ask: whoever is framing the urban issue towards which computation is 
addressed, are those groups nevertheless implemeŶƚŝŶŐĂĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƵƌďĂŶ “ĂƐũƵƐƚ
assemblies of functions and processes and of human agency as no more than the enactment 
ŽĨ ƌŽƵƚŝŶĞƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚ ŝŶ ƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞ ? ?  ?<ĂůůŝŶŝŬŽƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ?
Through the use of digital technologies, wide-scale data can be brought together in 
unprecedented ways to inform (or even automate) decisive actions in real-time. Inserting 
smart city platforms into cities may consequently privilege those forms of computational 
codified knowledge, and gives greater affordance to functional and instrumental processes 
above other forms of knowing and acting in the city such as knowledge embodied through 
acts of neighbourliness, or culturally-informed ways of caring. Making a smart city 
operational would imply turninŐƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůĐŝƚǇŝŶƚŽĂƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? “ƵƌďĂŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?ĂŐĞŶƚƐĂŶĚ
stakeholders, in order to be part of analytics, insights and action, have to be inside the 
ƉƌĞƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĨƚǁĂƌĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƚƐĞůĨ ?tŚŝůƐƚŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŶŐĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
develop relationships, the need for modularity, interoperability and transferability across 
systems  W and cities  W ƌĞǀŽŬĞƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐŝƚǇ ? ?DĂƌǀŝŶĂŶĚ>ƵƋƵĞ-Ayala, 2017: 15-16).  
                                                     
6 Such studies are underway in the research project from which this more general case 
study chapter comes  W see Knowledge Politics of Smart Urbanism 
https://smartknowledgepolitics.com/  
7 Initiatives like the Open Source Circular Economy Days are one forum for exploring these 
possibilities. https://oscedays.org/  
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On the other hand, data can be re-contextualised, and given greater social weight when 
framed and interpreted by the knowledges associated with plural experiences in the city 
(Tironi and Criado 2015). Open and transparent computation might help reveal implicit 
political and economic interests residing in hitherto unquestioned or unreflective notions of 
system operational efficiency, functional integration and purposes like international 
competitiveness. Hidden assumptions in the codifications of the software, and the loss of 
situated knowledge in the abstractions of the platforms, can be identified, rendered 
explicitly, and lead to corrections when code is open and programs run transparently. 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ <ƵƌďĂŶ Ğƚ Ăů ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ ƚĞĐŚŶŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?  “ƚŚŝƐ ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐ ĂŶĚ
contentious process amongst various actors reconfigures political relations and power 
ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶŐ ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ  ?ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ? ? ?
This would imply that the areas of urban life where computation is applied, and the agendas 
they serve, can be democratically controlled. Indeed, a critical challenge for further research 
focussing on the workings of smart city systems in practice is to understand whether there 
are inherent characteristics of computational ways of knowing the city, how those play out 
in relation to non-computational ways of knowing and governing the city and whether 
digital projects can indeed be (re)conceived through urban politics that interact across elite 
and grassroots settings, creating more plural and hopeful possibilities as is being attempted 
in Barcelona.   
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